“The most significant tech innovations don’t just disrupt markets—they reshape geopolitical realities,” remarked Professor Bhaskar Chakravorti during our recent conversation at The Fletcher School’s Digital Planet initiative. As we navigate the complex landscape of technology policy following the 2024 election, I’ve sought perspectives from leading experts on what might constitute the “Trump Tech Agenda” for the next four years.
The transition documents obtained by my team suggest technology innovation will be central to the administration‘s economic and national security strategies, though perhaps with approaches that diverge significantly from traditional frameworks.
Policy – The Return of Tech Nationalism
“What we’re witnessing isn’t just America First—it’s ‘America Only’ in many aspects of technology policy,” explains Dr. Monica Duffy Toft, Academic Dean at Fletcher. “The incoming administration views technological supremacy as non-negotiable, particularly in domains like artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and advanced semiconductors.”
This represents a continuation and likely amplification of previous policies that treated technology as a national security asset rather than a global commons. The implications extend beyond trade disputes to reshape fundamental assumptions about how technologies develop and diffuse globally.
“The administration appears committed to creating ‘sovereign tech stacks’ where critical digital infrastructure remains under direct U.S. control,” notes cybersecurity expert Professor Daniel Drezner. “This approach treats technology development as a zero-sum competition rather than an opportunity for collaborative innovation.”
Such policies could accelerate the splintering of the global internet into competing zones of technological influence, with significant consequences for companies operating across multiple jurisdictions.
Policy – Regulatory Rollbacks and Investment Priorities
Among the most consequential shifts may be the dramatic scaling back of regulatory oversight for emerging technologies. Internal transition documents suggest the new administration will pursue what one advisor termed “permission-less innovation” across multiple sectors.
“We should expect significant deregulation across areas like autonomous systems, experimental biotechnology, and private space ventures,” says technology policy researcher Dr. Josephine Wolff. “The administration views regulatory friction as America’s primary competitive disadvantage against countries like China.”
This approach would represent a sharp departure from the precautionary frameworks that have dominated U.S. technology governance for decades. The administration appears poised to replace them with outcome-based assessments that impose minimal restrictions on initial development and deployment.
However, this deregulatory stance will likely be paired with unprecedented funding for specific strategic technologies. Transition materials indicate plans for “National Technology Champions” programs that would provide substantial public investment in companies developing technologies deemed critical to national security.
“It’s essentially industrial policy by another name,” remarks Fletcher Professor Joel Trachtman. “The administration appears ready to pick winners in specific technology domains, particularly those with defense applications or where Chinese competition is perceived as threatening.”
Digital Trade and Data Sovereignty
Perhaps nowhere is the administration’s tech nationalism more evident than in its approach to cross-border data flows and digital services. Rather than pursuing multilateral agreements through organizations like the WTO, transition documents suggest a preference for bilateral deals that maximize U.S. leverage.
“The administration views data as the 21st century’s most valuable resource,” explains digital economy specialist Ryan Kroells. “Their approach treats American data as a national asset that should primarily benefit U.S. companies and citizens.”
This perspective will likely translate into policies that restrict data exports while demanding unfettered access to foreign markets for U.S. technology companies—an inherently asymmetric approach that may prove difficult to sustain diplomatically.
“We’re entering an era where the mechanics of data localization, algorithmic transparency requirements, and digital service taxes will become central to trade negotiations,” notes Ambassador Klaus Scharioth. “Traditional tariff discussions may become secondary to these digital sovereignty questions.”
Technology Sanctions as Foreign Policy
Another key element emerging from transition materials is the expanded use of technology export controls and sanctions as tools of foreign policy leverage. The administration appears ready to dramatically expand the Entity List of companies restricted from accessing U.S. technologies.
“Technology access has become the most powerful non-military coercive tool in America’s foreign policy arsenal,” observes international security expert Professor Eileen Babbitt. “But using it too broadly risks accelerating technological decoupling and self-sufficiency efforts by targeted nations.”
This weaponization of technology supply chains represents an evolution of approaches developed during previous administrations but applied with greater scope and intensity. The transition documents suggest particular focus on quantum computing, advanced AI systems, and biotechnology.
“When you restrict access to foundational technologies, you’re not just affecting current capabilities but future innovation trajectories,” notes science diplomacy researcher Dr. Arik Burakovsky. “These decisions will reverberate through technological development cycles for decades.”
Redefining Public-Private Technology Partnerships
Perhaps most interestingly, the incoming administration appears poised to fundamentally redefine the relationship between government and private technology companies. Rather than traditional procurement models, transition materials outline “National Technology Alliances” where leading companies receive significant regulatory exemptions and liability protections in exchange for prioritizing government requirements.
“It’s a profound shift in how we conceptualize the government’s role in technology development,” explains Dr. Susan Landau, professor of cybersecurity. “Rather than setting guardrails, the administration wants to actively steer innovation toward specific national priorities.”
This approach would represent a significant departure from the arm’s-length relationship that has characterized much of U.S. technology policy. It also raises important questions about technological capture, market concentration, and the potential for government influence over nominally private platforms.
“When you blur the lines between national security imperatives and commercial technology development, you introduce complex accountability questions,” warns technology ethics researcher Professor Bhaskar Chakravorti. “Who ultimately controls these technologies and ensures they’re deployed responsibly?”
As I reflect on these conversations with Fletcher experts, what emerges is not just a set of policy positions but a fundamentally different vision of technology’s role in society and international relations. The administration appears to view technological dominance not merely as an economic advantage but as the defining element of national power in the 21st century.
Whether this approach succeeds in accelerating American innovation while managing its inevitable disruptive effects remains to be seen. What’s certain is that the technological landscape four years from now will bear the indelible imprint of decisions made in these early days of a new administration.
